In explaining its view of the pleading standards in a disparate treatment discrimination case, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) shed light on its interpretation of the Truth in Lending Act’s (“TILA’s”) appraisal independence standards, providing that a lender is not required to rely on a biased appraisal.

The underlying case relates to a claim that an appraiser undervalued a home because of the homeowners’ race, and that the lender knew of the undervaluation. In mid-March, the CFPB and the Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest in the case, addressing the applicability of nondiscrimination principles in the property valuation context. In doing so, the agencies also addressed the federal requirements for appraiser independence.

TILA and its Regulation Z prohibit lenders or other covered persons from coercing, instructing, or inducing an appraiser to cause the appraised value to be based on any factor other than the appraiser’s independent judgment. They also prohibit lenders from suborning any mischaracterization of a property’s appraised value or materially altering a property valuation. A lender that reasonably believes an appraiser has materially violated ethical or professional requirements must report the appraiser to the appropriate state agency. In addition, to comply with Regulation Z’s conflict-of-interest requirements, mortgage lenders generally ensure that the appraiser reports to a person who is not part of the lenders’ loan production function, and that no person in that function is involved in selecting the appraiser. Agencies and investors may impose additional requirements or prohibitions addressing appraisal independence.

The regulations expressly permit a lender to ask the appraiser to consider additional information, provide further detail or explanation, or correct errors. However, lenders must walk a fine line – while they may ask for additional information, explanations, or corrections, they are understandably careful in questioning an appraiser’s conclusions and are limited in their ability to obtain a second appraisal. (For instance, Fannie Mae generally prohibits its lenders from obtaining a second appraisal without a reasonable and documented basis for believing that the first appraisal is flawed.)Continue Reading CFPB Addresses the Fine Lines of Appraisal Independence

Today, in another legal blow to the CFPB, a federal court in Illinois dismissed the Bureau’s redlining lawsuit against Townstone Financial (“Townstone”) and its owner.

The Bureau made waves back in 2020 when it filed the lawsuit, which was the first public redlining action brought by the Bureau against a non-bank mortgage lender. While the

Pay close attention to New Jersey Bill A793, the Community Wealth Preservation Act, which the New Jersey legislature passed at the end of June and sent to the Governor for consideration.  While I’m not steeped in the intricacies of state foreclosure laws, it appears the Act would cap a holder’s bid at foreclosure sale

Mortgage loan servicers have a wide range of responsibilities. However, does everything servicers do constitute “servicing”? Or do servicers do some things that are not “servicing”?

The answer is important because the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act and its Regulation X impose strict obligations on servicers to respond to certain borrower communications related to “servicing,” but not to nonservicing. The courts, including two recent federal courts of appeals, are drawing fine lines between the two.

RESPA requires a mortgage loan servicer to respond in a timely manner to a borrower’s request to correct errors relating to “allocation of payments, final balances for purposes of paying off the loan, or avoiding foreclosure, or other standard servicer’s duties.” Section 1024.35 of Regulation X specifies that a servicer must acknowledge, investigate, and respond to a borrower’s “notice of error” within strict timeframes, so long as the notice is in writing and provides enough information for the servicer to identify the account and the asserted error. In addition, after receipt of a notice of error, a servicer is prohibited, for 60 days, from furnishing adverse information to a consumer reporting agency regarding any payment that is the subject of the notice.

Section 1024.35 then provides a list of covered errors that are subject to those requirements. The list includes errors that could arise in typical servicing activities – errors related to the acceptance, application, or crediting of borrower payments; and to disbursing amounts for taxes, insurance premiums, or other charges. The list of covered errors also includes those that could arise in default servicing – errors related to providing information regarding loss mitigation options, making foreclosure notices or filings, moving for foreclosure judgments or orders of sale, or conducting foreclosure sales.

Then, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) included a catch-all provision to section 1024.35, such that a covered error includes “any other error relating to the servicing of a borrower’s mortgage loan.”

Courts have been considering the scope of those responsibilities since even before the CFPB issued that list in 2013. Recently, two circuit courts of appeals have indicated that some activities of servicers do not constitute “servicing,” particularly where loan modifications are involved.
Continue Reading Mortgage Servicing “Notices of Error” – Does The Catch-All Catch It All?

Businesses that place phone calls or send text messages to consumers may find some relief in a recent United States Supreme Court decision that limits the applicability of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). The TCPA prohibits any person from placing phone calls (including text messages) to a wireless number using an automated telephone dialing

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) prohibits most automated calls or texts to cell phones, but it makes an exception for calls or texts that seek to collect on U.S. government debts. Today, the Supreme Court held that this exception violates the First Amendment because it applies to only certain types of speech.

A United States Magistrate Judge for the United States District Court, Western District of New York, today issued his report and recommendation on the defendants’ motion to dismiss in Petersen et al. v. Chase Card Funding, LLC et al., No. 1:19-cv-00741 (W.D.N.Y. June 6, 2019). The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of both the plaintiff’s

On August 19, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) published a proposed rule for the purpose of aligning HUD’s 2013 Disparate Impact Rule with the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities. HUD sought comments from relevant stakeholders and the public on the

Today, the Supreme Court returned to the lower courts the question whether a 2006 order by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is binding on the district court. In PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, the Court held that resolution of that question may depend on the resolution of two preliminary questions: (1) whether the order is the equivalent of a “legislative rule” that has the force of law; and (2) whether the party challenging the FCC’s interpretation had a prior and adequate opportunity to seek judicial review of the order.

As background, the petitioners in the case produced a reference guide about prescription drugs, and sent healthcare providers faxes stating that the providers could reserve a free copy of the e-book version of the reference guide. One fax recipient brought a putative class action, alleging that the fax was an “unsolicited advertisement” within the meaning of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The district court dismissed the case, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Hobbs Act—which gives courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of certain final orders by the FCC—required the district court to follow the FCC’s 2006 interpretation of the term “unsolicited advertisement” as including “any offer of a free good or service.”

In an opinion written by Justice Breyer and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded.
Continue Reading Supreme Court Declines To Answer Whether District Court Is Bound To Follow FCC’s Interpretation of TCPA

Federal redlining enforcement has waned in recent years, but redlining risk has not disappeared.  On October 4, two consumer advocacy groups, the National Fair Housing Alliance and the Connecticut Fair Housing Center, filed a law suit accusing a Connecticut-based bank of unlawful discrimination against minority homebuyers. The suit alleges that Liberty Bank, a state-chartered bank