Today, the Supreme Court returned to the lower courts the question whether a 2006 order by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is binding on the district court. In PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, the Court held that resolution of that question may depend on the resolution of two preliminary questions: (1) whether the order is the equivalent of a “legislative rule” that has the force of law; and (2) whether the party challenging the FCC’s interpretation had a prior and adequate opportunity to seek judicial review of the order.

As background, the petitioners in the case produced a reference guide about prescription drugs, and sent healthcare providers faxes stating that the providers could reserve a free copy of the e-book version of the reference guide. One fax recipient brought a putative class action, alleging that the fax was an “unsolicited advertisement” within the meaning of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The district court dismissed the case, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Hobbs Act—which gives courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of certain final orders by the FCC—required the district court to follow the FCC’s 2006 interpretation of the term “unsolicited advertisement” as including “any offer of a free good or service.”

In an opinion written by Justice Breyer and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded.
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Federal redlining enforcement has waned in recent years, but redlining risk has not disappeared.  On October 4, two consumer advocacy groups, the National Fair Housing Alliance and the Connecticut Fair Housing Center, filed a law suit accusing a Connecticut-based bank of unlawful discrimination against minority homebuyers. The suit alleges that Liberty Bank, a state-chartered bank

Foreign statutory trusts that acquire delinquent residential mortgage loans are NOT required to be licensed under the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act (the “Act”), based on an opinion released today by the Maryland Court of Appeals. The opinion reverses lower court rulings that called for such licensing. According to the opinion, the Act’s plain

In a June 21, 2018 opinion, Judge Loretta Preska of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the structure of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (“BCFP” or the “Bureau”) is unconstitutional. This ruling is inconsistent with the D.C. Circuit’s en banc decision in PHH Corp. v. CFPB (“PHH”).

The case, CFPB v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, involves joint claims brought by the Bureau and the New York State Office of the Attorney General. RD Legal offers cash advances to consumers waiting on payouts from settlement agreements or judgments entered in their favor. The claims allege that the company defrauded 9/11 first responders and NFL retirees by misleading them regarding cash advances that were represented as valid sales but instead were loans made in violation of state usury law.

RD Legal argued that the BCFP’s structure as an independent bureau within the Federal Reserve System violates Article II of the United States Constitution, as the Bureau’s Director can be removed only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” In reviewing that claim, Judge Preska sided with one of the dissenting opinions in PHH. Specifically, she noted that she “disagrees with the holding of the en banc court and instead adopts Sections I-IV of Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s dissent…, where, based on considerations of history, liberty, and presidential authority, Judge Kavanaugh concluded that the CFPB ‘is unconstitutionally structured because it is an independent agency that exercises substantial executive power and is headed by a single director.’”
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The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Lusnak v. Bank of America, N.A.—holding that the National Bank Act did not preempt a California law requiring banks to pay interest on certain funds held in escrow accounts for mortgage borrowers—has received considerable attention in the consumer finance industry. Bank of

On May 15, the Supreme Court held that a debt collector does not violate the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA) by knowingly attempting to collect a debt in bankruptcy proceedings after the statute of limitations for collecting that debt has expired. As explained in Mayer Brown’s Decision Alerts, the FDCPA generally prohibits a

The U.S. House of Representatives on Thursday passed two bills that would reform the standards for bringing federal class actions and raise the bar for keeping lawsuits in state courts.

The first bill, the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017 (HR 985), would impose several new requirements on class action and

The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) operates under a corporate charter, which authorizes Fannie Mae “to sue and to be sued, and to complain and to defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal.” 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(a). On January 18, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this “sue-and-be-sued” clause does not

New regulations will impose increased inspection, reporting, and maintenance obligations on mortgagees and servicers of defaulted residential mortgage loans in New York.  You can learn more about the regulations of the New York Department of Financial Services for “zombie” properties in Mayer Brown’s latest Legal Update.  The regulations become effective today, December 20, 2016.

On November 3, in a case that was closely watched by industry participants, the Florida Supreme Court held that a mortgagor’s default that occurs after the dismissal of a prior foreclosure action in which the loan payments were accelerated resets the five-year statute of limitations for filing a subsequent foreclosure suit.  In Bartram v. U.S. Bank, N.A., the court explained that dismissal of the initial foreclosure action has the effect of returning the parties to their pre-foreclosure complaint status, where the mortgage remains an installment loan and the mortgagor has the right to continue to make installment payments without being obligated to pay the entire amount due under the note and mortgage.
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